INTRODUCTION
In the convenience store, the cigarette packages are in their usual location behind the counter. A smoker, you approach the cashier and ask for your brand of choice. She passes you a pack, which you take without much thought. In your hands it feels like it always has, the same familiar size and weight. But as you fetch your wallet to pay for it, something about its label catches your eye: it is significantly different than what you have grown accustomed to. The name and logo of the brand are still there, but covering half of the package is a color photo of a man smoking a cigarette through a hole in his throat. Accompanying this disturbing image are the words "WARNING: Cigarettes are addictive." Surprised, you strain to see the other packages behind the counter; they too, you notice, follow this new labeling scheme. You look back down at the package and for a few beats consider the gruesome image and its textual admonition. You are now faced with a choice: do you buy the cigarettes and eventually smoke them, or do you leave the package at the counter and exit the store?
Consumers of cigarettes in the United States may soon be asking themselves this and similar questions as a result of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 2 (TCA). Among its provisions, the TCA requires the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to select images that depict smoking's deleterious effects and compels tobacco companies to display the images, accompanied by a textual warning, on half of the front and rear panels of every cigarette package. 3 This new graphic format, the first alteration of cigarette package warnings in over twenty-five years, 4 represents a significant and aggressive change in the way that the government communicates the dangers of smoking to the public.
To prevent the introduction of these new labels into the marketplace, the tobacco industry has filed suit in two federal courts, alleging that the graphic warnings infringe on its First Amendment right to refrain from speaking. Consequently, the rollout of the new labels, originally slated for September 2012, 5 is now uncertain. In limbo, too, is the appropriate framework for assessing the constitutionality of this regulation and the extent to which the government can warn the public about the dangers of smoking and other activities deemed harmful or unhealthy.
In 2012, two circuits considered this issue and divided sharply over the labels' constitutionality and the appropriate framework for assessing them. The Sixth Circuit determined that the labels were subject to strict scrutiny unless an exemption-namely, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, providing for rational basis review of disclosures meant to correct potentially misleading commercial speech 6 -applied. 7 The court found that, because the labels disclose factual information, such an exemption did apply. 8 The court then reviewed the labeling requirement using the Zauderer rational basis standard and found that the provision satisfied this test. 9 For this reason, the Sixth Circuit held that the labeling requirement did not violate the First Amendment. 10 In contrast, the D.C. Circuit determined that the labels were subject to intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission 11 unless the Zauderer exception applied. 12 The court found that the labels did not correct potentially misleading speech and thus found Zauderer inapplicable. 13 After examining the images using intermediate scrutiny, the court found that the labels did not satisfy this standard. 14 Consequently, the D.C. Circuit held that the labels violated the First Amendment. 15 Adding to the confusion, although each circuit court upheld the judgment of its respective trial court, 16 each employed a different level of scrutiny than its district court. 17 Further, neither circuit court decision was unanimous. 18 This Note analyzes this legal fissure. It focuses on identifying and applying the appropriate framework for assessing the graphic warning labels' constitutional fitness. It concludes that the warnings should be examined under strict scrutiny unless the Zauderer exception applies. Moreover, it argues that the graphic warning labels do not correct potentially misleading speech as defined by Zauderer and its progeny, that Zauderer does not apply, and that strict scrutiny does. This Note concludes that, under this intense level of scrutiny, the cigarette labels proposed by the FDA do not pass muster and are therefore unconstitutional compulsions of speech.
Part I of this Note first examines the federal government's attempts to educate the public about smoking through package warning labels and then reviews the applicable First Amendment jurisprudence. Part II describes the different frameworks that the Sixth and D.C. Circuits and the district courts used to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny and the application of their chosen scrutiny. Part III contends that strict scrutiny should apply unless Zauderer does, that Zauderer does not apply and thus strict scrutiny does, and that the regulation is unconstitutional when subjected to this review.
I. CIGARETTE WARNING LABELS AND THE RIGHT (NOT) TO SPEAK
The litigation over the TCA's labeling requirement sits at the intersection of public health policy and freedom of expression. In order to fully appreciate the split in the circuit courts, it is necessary to understand the government's history of requiring warning labels on cigarette packages, the new format mandated by the TCA, and the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. Accordingly, this part sets forth this context, with Part I.A tracing the government's attempts to educate consumers about the health consequences of smoking through warning labels on cigarette packages, the TCA's graphic warning labeling requirement, and the FDA's implementation of that provision. Part I.B surveys the speech-and silence-that the First Amendment protects, focusing in particular on the Supreme Court's compelled and commercial speech doctrines and its treatment of factual disclosures.
A. Cigarette Warning Labels: The Government Attempts To Inform the Public About the Dangers of Smoking
The adverse effects of cigarette smoking are considerable. 19 According to the Surgeon General, tobacco use is the leading preventable cause of death in the United States. 20 Smoking-related diseases 21 kill 443,000 Americans each year, 22 more than are killed by HIV, illegal drug use, alcohol use, motor vehicle injuries, suicides, and murders combined. 23 The economic losses stemming from tobacco use are also staggering: in the United States alone, smoking accounts annually for over $193 billion in lost productivity and health care expenditures. 24 These considerable health and financial costs contrast with the billions of dollars in profits made each year 19 . The Surgeon General has concluded that "[s]moking harms nearly every organ of the body, causing many diseases and reducing the health of smokers in general." See U.S. DEP by the tobacco industry 25 and the billions of dollars spent by that industry annually on advertising and other promotions. 26 To address this public health threat and to counteract the tobacco industry's financial and advertising strength, the federal government has implemented a number of regulatory and legislative initiatives, including mandating the placement of warning labels on every pack of cigarettes. This section outlines the history of the government's response, the TCA's graphic labeling scheme, and the images chosen by the FDA to appear on future cigarette labels. Although physicians had suspected a connection between smoking and disease for centuries, 28 the first medical studies confirming that link did not appear until the 1920s. 29 In the years following these initial studies, thousands of laboratory, autopsy, and epidemiologic studies examined the relationship between tobacco use and disease. 30 With the evidence mounting, the Surgeon General convened an advisory committee to examine the issue in 1962. 31 the Surgeon General declared cigarette smoking to be a significant health hazard in need of immediate attention. 34 Reacting to the Surgeon General's findings, Congress enacted the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 35 (FCLAA) in 1965. 36 The FCLAA gave the Federal Trade Commission the authority to regulate cigarette labels 37 and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) the authority to regulate tobacco advertising on radio and television. 38 The new law also delegated authority to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) to regulate other aspect of the tobacco industry. 39 Finally, the FCLAA required tobacco companies to display a textual warning in "a conspicuous place" on all cigarette packages starting in 1966. 40 This warning read: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health." 41 With the introduction of this warning, the United States became the first country to mandate a warning label on cigarette packages. 42 Since the appearance of this initial warning in 1966, Congress has twice modified the wording of the required warning. In 1970, the Public Health HEALTH SERVICE 31 (1964) , available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBBMQ.pdf ("In view of the continuing and mounting evidence from many sources, it is the judgment of the Committee that cigarette smoking contributes substantially to mortality from certain specific diseases and to the overall death rate.").
34. See id. at 33 ("Cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action." (emphasis omitted) , at A1 (characterizing the TCA as "the first big federal step against smoking since the 1971 ban against tobacco advertising on television and radio and the 1988 rules against smoking on airline flights-but potentially much more sweeping than either of those moves"). products in 1996, 59 the TCA gives the FDA exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the tobacco industry. 60 In exchange, however, the TCA prohibits the FDA from banning the sale of tobacco or mandating the elimination of nicotine from cigarettes. 61 Among other provisions, the TCA affects the ability of tobacco companies to sell and market their products. 62 These limitations include restricting the marketing of "modified risk tobacco products," 63 outlawing claims that a tobacco product is safe or safer as a result of FDA regulation; 64 28, 1996) . The FDCA prohibits any misbranded food, drug, or device from entering into interstate commerce. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2006). After extensive fact-finding, the FDA determined that nicotine was a "drug" and cigarettes and smokeless tobacco were "devices" that deliver nicotine to the body within the meaning of the FDCA, and thus tobacco products were within its regulatory purview. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(2)-(3) (defining a "device" as having an "intended" effect on the structure or function of the body or an "intended" use in the cure or prevention of disease). , and 21 U.S.C.) (amending the FDCA to add § 911(b)(2)(A)) (prohibiting (1) "the label, labeling, or advertising" of a tobacco product from "explicitly or implicitly" suggesting that the product is less harmful than other tobacco products, and (2) a "tobacco product manufacturer" from taking "any action directed to consumers through the media or otherwise . . . respecting the product that would be reasonably expected to result in consumers believing that the tobacco product or its smoke may" be less harmful than other tobacco products, without prior FDA approval of the product as "modified risk").
64. See id. § § 103(b), 301(tt) (amending the FDCA to add § 331(tt)) (prohibiting tobacco companies from making "any express or implied statement or representation directed to consumers . . . through the media or advertising" that "conveys, or misleads or would mislead consumers into believing, that (1) 67 and the distribution of free sample cigarettes. 68 The TCA also mandates a new, three-element warning label that replaces the previous labeling format. First, the TCA requires all cigarette packages to bear one of the following nine textual warnings: "Cigarettes are addictive" "Tobacco smoke can harm your children" "Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease" "Cigarettes cause cancer" "Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease" "Smoking during pregnancy can harm your baby" "Smoking can kill you" "Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers" "Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to your health." 69 Second, the TCA specifies that the labels "shall comprise the top 50 percent of the front and rear panels of the package" and that the word "WARNING" should appear in capital letters in seventeen-point font. 70 Third, the TCA requires "color graphics depicting the negative health consequences of smoking" to accompany the textual warnings. 71 The FDA states that the purpose of these new graphic labels is to convey information about the 65. Section 102(a)(2) requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to promulgate a regulation that "shall be identical in its provisions to part 897 of the regulations promulgated by the Secretary . . . in the August 28, 1996, issue of the Federal Register (61 Fed. Reg. 44,615-18)." Id. § 102(a)(2). Section 897.32(a) of those regulations prohibits every "manufacturer, distributor, and retailer" of tobacco products from "advertising, . . . disseminating or causing to be disseminated, any labeling or advertising for cigarettes or smokeless tobacco" unless such labeling or advertising consists of "only black text on a white background." 61 Fed. Reg. 44,617, § 897.32(a) (Aug. 28, 1996) .
66. See TCA § 102(a) (adopting 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,615-18, § 897.34(c)) (prohibiting any "manufacturer, distributor, or retailer" of tobacco products from "sponsor[ing] or caus[ing] to be sponsored any athletic, musical, artistic, or other social or cultural event, or any entry or team in any event, in the brand name . . . , logo, symbol, motto, selling message, recognizable color or pattern of colors, or any other indicia of product identification identical or similar to, or identifiable with, those used for any brand of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco")).
67. See id. § 102(a) (adopting 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,617, § 897.34(a)) (prohibiting any manufacturer of tobacco products from marketing, distributing, or selling any promotional item bearing the "brand name . . . , logo, symbol, motto, selling message, [or] recognizable color or pattern of colors" of any tobacco product brand)).
68. See id. § 102(a)(1), (a)(2)(G) (adopting and amending 61 Fed. Reg. 44,616-17, § 897.16(d)) (prohibiting any "manufacturer, distributor, or retailer" of "cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, or other tobacco products" from "distribut [ing] Pursuant to the TCA, the FDA issued a proposed rule on November 12, 2010 73 and sought comment on thirty-six potential images to accompany the nine textual warnings. 74 During the comment period that followed, the FDA received, reviewed, and responded to over 1,700 comments. 75 Also, the FDA commissioned an 18,000-person, internet-based consumer study to research the efficacy of the thirty-six proposed images. 76 Finally, the FDA considered empirical evidence from research studies that explored the efficacy of the graphic warning labels already in place in Australia and Canada. 77 Based on this evidence, the FDA selected nine images and promulgated a final rule on June 22, 2011. 78 The graphics chosen by the FDA to appear on cigarette labeling include photos of (1) a man smoking a cigarette through a tracheotomy; (2) diseased lungs; (3) a mouth with stained teeth and an open sore; (4) a cadaver with chest staples laying on an autopsy table; (5) a woman crying; (6) a man wearing a T-shirt with the words "I Quit" on it; (7) a baby and an adult, presumably a parent, surrounded by curling cigarette smoke; (8) a patient hooked up to an oxygen mask; and (9) a drawing of a crying newborn in an incubator. 79 Additionally, the final rule requires the new 72 . See Final Rule, supra note 5, at 36,633 (discussing the "primary goal" of the larger, graphic warnings in response to a comment questioning the new labeling format's efficacy).
73 76. This FDA-sponsored study "quantitatively examined the relative efficacy of the 36 proposed color graphic images in communicating the harms of smoking." Id. at 36,637. The D.C. Circuit in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco described the setup of this study succinctly:
The study divided respondents into two groups: a control group that was shown the new text in the format of the current warnings (located on the side of cigarette packages), and a separate treatment group that was shown the proposed graphic warnings, which included the new text, the accompanying graphic image, and the 1-800-QUIT-NOW number. Each group then answered questions designed to assess, among other things, whether the graphic warnings, relative to the text-only control, (1) increased viewers' intention to quit or refrain from smoking; (2) increased viewers' knowledge of the health risks of smoking or secondhand smoke; and (3) were "salient," which FDA defined in part as causing viewers to feel "depressed," "discouraged," or "afraid. warnings to list the phone number of a smoking cessation hotline, 1-800-QUIT-NOW. 80 
B. The First Amendment: The Freedom To Speak and Not To Speak
The First Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." 81 The freedom of expression is a fundamental, foundational right 82 and is central to the democratic process and individual participation in it. 83 As such, the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects individuals from federal, state, and local governmental interference with this right. 84 Constitutional scholars argue that the First Amendment was a reaction against political speech and press restrictions in English society. 85 Outside this narrow realm, however, it is unclear what the drafters intended the First Amendment to protect. 86 As such, the Supreme Court has had to opine on the speech that the First Amendment protects, the speech that the government can regulate, and the proper framework for scrutinizing the constitutionality of such acts. 87 This section briefly introduces the First Amendment, as well as the Court's approach to evaluating measures that compel speech, measures that restrict commercial speech, and measures that require factual disclosures.
An Introduction to the First Amendment
The First Amendment's language is simple and unqualified. 88 Despite this simplicity and absoluteness, 89 however, the Supreme Court has never taken an absolutist approach in interpreting it. 90 Rather, it has held that the First Amendment allows restraints on free speech for "appropriate reasons." 91 The Court's approach to determining the legitimate instances in which speech may be restricted is one based on content neutrality. 92 According to this framework, regulations affecting speech are classified either as content based or content neutral. 93 Content-based laws, as the moniker suggests, restrict or compel speech based on the speech's content. 94 With some categorical exceptions, 95 these regulations are "presumptively invalid" 96 unless they pass muster under strict scrutiny, the highest level of judicial review. 97 To survive strict scrutiny, the government must (1) show a compelling interest in promulgating the regulation, (2) narrowly tailor the regulation to promote that interest, and (3) demonstrate that no less restrictive alternative is available. 98 Underlying this hardline approach is the core belief that "each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence" and that "Government action 88 that stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the Government, contravenes this essential right." 99 So severe is this burden that the government rarely meets it. 100 In contrast to content-based laws, content-neutral regulations affect speech without regard to the speech's content. 101 The Court allows the government to place reasonable content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on speech. 102 Accordingly, such measures are examined under intermediate scrutiny, which is a more lenient form of judicial review. 103 To survive intermediate scrutiny, the government must show that (1) the regulation is within its constitutional power, (2) the regulation furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, (3) the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and (4) the restriction is no greater than necessary to further that interest. 104 This is not to imply, however, that all speech and all laws that regulate speech fall neatly into this either-or framework. 105 Indeed, the Court has deemed certain classes of speech as having "lower value" and thus entitled to less or no protection under the First Amendment. 106 These categories include obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech relating to criminal conduct. 107 Additionally, commercial speech 108 118 The Court agreed, finding that the law impermissibly invaded the students' "intellect and spirit," which the First Amendment protects from "official control." 119 Justice Robert Jackson, writing for the Court, articulated this idea and, in the process, established the Court's compelled speech doctrine:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. 120 Forty-four years later in 1977, the Court reaffirmed Barnette's central precept in Wooley. 121 In Wooley, a husband and wife challenged a New Hampshire law that made it a crime to block out any part of that state's automobile license plate, including the state motto embossed on it. 122 The couple considered that motto, "Live Free or Die," repugnant to their moral, the Court's approach to required disclosures that correct potential misleading speech, which is rational basis review).
111. religious, and political beliefs and covered it up, resulting in multiple misdemeanor charges. 123 Reviewing the law for First Amendment defects, the Supreme Court found the law to be unconstitutional, explaining: "The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of individual freedom of mind." 124 This core value thus prohibited New Hampshire from compelling the couple to "use their private property as a 'mobile billboard' for the State's ideological message." 125 As Barnette and Wooley illustrate, the Court treats identically laws that compel content-based speech and laws that restrict content-based speech and subjects both to strict scrutiny review. 126 In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, the Court made clear that this right not to speak extends not only to individuals but also to corporations. 127 In that case, the Court scrutinized a decision by a California regulator that forced Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), a private utility company, to print on its billing envelopes the views of a private advocacy organization with which the company disagreed. 128 Equating the envelopes at issue with the automobile in Wooley, the Court determined that strict scrutiny applied, held that the regulator could not order the utility to use its private property to distribute the third party's message, 129 The thinking behind it was that advertising promoted the use of electricity, which increased consumer demand despite insufficient sources of supply. 154 Three years after the ban, the energy crisis had passed, but the advertising restriction remained in force. 155 Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation filed suit, alleging that the ban violated its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 156 In this context, the Court developed and applied its four-prong test. 157 The Court found that the first two prongs of the test were satisfied 158 : the utility's promotional advertising was not misleading or unlawful, 159 and the State's asserted interests in conserving energy and maintaining fair and efficient electricity rates were substantial. 160 Under the third prong, the Court accepted the State's argument that advertising and electricity demand were directly connected and that an advertising ban would lessen demand for it, thus establishing a link between the State's interest in conservation and the Commission's advertising ban. 161 However, the regulation failed the fourth prong of the test. 162 Under it, the Court concluded that the State had failed to establish that the regulation was not more extensive than necessary to further its substantial interest in energy conservation. 163 Troubling to the Court was that the ban implicated all promotional advertising regardless of its effect on energy consumption; the State had not shown that a less restrictive regulation would not accomplish its goal of energy conservation. 164 For this reason, the Court declared the law unconstitutional. 165 With Central Hudson, the Court established a test for examining measures that regulate commercial speech. 166 In doing so, however, the Court did not specify the scope of this test. 167 It was therefore unclear if the standard should apply solely to the type of restriction addressed in Central Hudson-a law that restricts speech-or if the standard should apply more generally to any law that affects commercial speech, regardless of whether that law restricts speech or compels it. 168 Of note, however, is that since its 154 
Factual Disclosures that Prevent Consumer Deception
Five years after Central Hudson, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of a required disclosure provision in Zauderer. 170 The Court held that compelled disclosures of "purely factual and uncontroversial information" that aim to protect consumers from "confusion or deception" and that are not "unjustified or unduly burdensome" are to be reviewed under the rational basis standard. 171 In so holding, the Court carved out an exception to its compelled and commercial speech doctrines: if a compelled disclosure met certain criteria, then rational basis review, the lowest level of judicial scrutiny, applied. Since that decision, courts have applied and developed this exception.
a. The Supreme Court Creates the Zauderer Exception to Strict Scrutiny for the Correction of Potentially Misleading Speech
Zauderer involved an Ohio attorney who published an advertisement offering to represent women who were injured by a faulty medical device. 172 The advertisement featured an illustration of the medical device and asserted that losing clients would not owe legal fees; 173 it did not disclose that clients would owe court costs and expenses. 174 The Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio disciplined the lawyer for publishing this advertisement on the grounds that he violated three Disciplinary Rules of the Ohio Code of Professional Practice: a rule prohibiting advertisements containing information or advice about a specific legal problem; a rule banning the use of illustrations in attorney advertising; and a rule forbidding attorney deception. 175 lawyer appealed the decision, contending that the Ohio Code violated the First Amendment. 176 The Supreme Court examined the three code provisions for First Amendment defects, striking down the first two but upholding the third. 177 Regarding the first, the Court held that a state could not prohibit advertising geared to persons with a specific legal problem. 178 As for the second, the Court recognized that visual components of advertisements served important communicative functions: graphics attract the attention of the audience to the advertiser's message and have the ability to impart information directly. 179 For this reason, images were entitled to the same First Amendment protections afforded verbal commercial speech. 180 Consequently, the Court held that advertisements could contain illustrations as long as those graphic were not deceptive, misleading, or confusing. 181 The Court found, however, that the third disciplinary charge brought against the lawyer-that is, his failure to disclose in the advertisement that his clients might be liable for litigation costs even if their lawsuits were unsuccessful-was constitutional. 182 Notably, the Court declined to use either strict scrutiny or the Central Hudson test to assess the rule's constitutionality. 183 Rather, the Court reviewed the rule using rational basis assessment. 184 The Court gave two reasons for taking this approach. 185 First, the Court distinguished the speech requirement in Wooley and Barnette from the disclosure requirement at issue in Zauderer. 186 In Wooley and Barnette, laws forced speakers to voice political, nationalistic, religious orthodoxy, or other "matters of opinion," 187 while in Zauderer, the requirement compelled the disclosure of "purely factual and uncontroversial information" about legal services. 188 For the Court, this was significant, as the Zauderer disclosure was of importance to consumers. 189 value to consumers. In this case, an attorney's constitutionally protected interest in not providing the required factual information was "minimal." 190 Second, the Court found that unlike the regulation at issue in Central Hudson, the disclosure requirement did not restrict speech-it compelled it 191 -and thus encroached more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than an across-the-board prohibition. 192 For these the two reasons, the Court decided to employ rational basis review, finding that the disclosure requirement was reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing consumer deception of consumers, and upheld the rule. 193 Thus, with Zauderer, the Court established a rational basis standard that is applicable to certain laws that require disclosures. If (1) a compelled disclosure consists of "purely factual and uncontroversial information," (2) aims to protect consumers from "confusion or deception," and (3) is not "unjustified or unduly burdensome," then that disclosure requirement is scrutinized to determine if it reasonably relates to the state's interest, rather than the more stringent strict scrutiny standard that is applied in other First Amendment contexts. 194 
b. Zauderer Applied: Three Instructive Cases
After the Supreme Court defined this narrow exception to its compelled and commercial speech doctrines, the Court and numerous circuit courts have ruled on the constitutionality of disclosure requirements. In doing so, the courts have delineated the reach and import of the Zauderer exception. on her law office letterhead. 200 The Florida Board of Accountancy, a state regulator, argued that the use of this "specialist" designation was "potentially misleading" to consumers. 201 The board sought to require Ibanez to include a disclaimer on her promotional materials that explained that the accrediting agency was not affiliated with the government and that set out the agency's accreditation requirements. 202 On review, the Supreme Court found the board's action unjustified because it had failed "to point to any harm that is potentially real, not purely hypothetical." 203 As such, the Court declined to apply the Zauderer standard because the board could not show that the commercial speech at issue would mislead consumers. 204 The Court also noted that the proposed disclaimer was "unduly burdensome." 205 Milavetz is another case cited in litigation over the graphic warning labels. In Milavetz, the Court analyzed and upheld two disclosure provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) using Zauderer. 206 One of the challenged provisions required debt relief agencies to "clearly and conspicuously disclose in any advertisement of bankruptcy assistance services . . . that the services or benefits are with respect to bankruptcy relief." 207 Another provision required qualifying professionals to state: "We are a debt relief agency. We help people file for bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy Code." 208 The Milavetz law firm challenged the enforcement of BAPCPA's disclosure requirements, 209 arguing an intermediate scrutiny standard governed and that the State's attempt to compel speech should be struck down. 210 The Court declined to apply Central Hudson for two reasons. 211 First, the Court found that the BAPCPA provision "share[d] the essential features of the rule at issue in Zauderer." 212 Because the BAPCPA provision, like the rule of professional conduct at issue in Zauderer, was directed at correcting misleading speech, Zauderer governed. 213 Second, the Court distinguished the challenged BAPCPA disclosure requirement, which compelled speech, from the rule scrutinized in Central Hudson, which restricted speech. 214 The Court then examined the BAPCPA provision and upheld it because, like in Zauderer, the law firm's advertisements were "inherently misleading" because the advertisements promised "debt relief without any reference to the possibility of filing for bankruptcy, which has inherent costs." 215 Finally, Blagojevich, a decision from the Seventh Circuit, is also informative. At issue in Blagojevich was an Illinois law that required video game retailers to place a four-square-inch "18" sticker on video games that fell within the State's definition of "sexually explicit." 216 The Seventh Circuit concluded that the sticker "force[d] the game-seller to include . . . a subjective and highly controversial message-that the game's content is sexually explicit." 217 Because of the subjectivity and controversial nature of this required disclosure, the Seventh Circuit held that Zauderer did not apply and instead used strict scrutiny. 218 In doing so, it found that the sticker "literally fail[ed] to be narrowly tailored" because the sticker covered a substantial portion of the box and the State "failed to . . . explain why a smaller sticker would not suffice." 219 In Discount Tobacco City, the Sixth Circuit considered a facial challenge 223 to the TCA's labeling requirement. 224 The court determined that the provision was subject to the strict scrutiny required by the First Amendment unless the speech was designed to correct misleading information, in which case Zauderer controlled. 225 Applying this framework, the court determined that the Zauderer rational basis test governed 226 and held that the regulation passed this review and was constitutional. 227 In doing so, the panel majority upheld the district court's judgment. 228 cat=news&id=1298458 (calling the TCA "an important step forward" and "tough but reasonable" but "not perfect" because of some of its provisions infringe on the First Amendment).
232. See Commonwealth Brands, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d at 529. 233. The tobacco companies challenged four other provisions of the TCA: (1) restrictions on the marketing of "modified-risk tobacco products"; (2) a ban on claims that convey the under the First Amendment. 234 Because of this timing, the suit constituted a facial challenge to the labeling provision. 235 As such, the district court assessed the First Amendment constitutionality of the provision itself; it did not examine the particular images that the FDA eventually chose for the labels. 236 The tobacco companies put forth three arguments in support of their claim. 237 First, relying on Ibanez and citing data demonstrating that the public was aware of smoking's risks and overestimated them, 238 the companies argued that because there was no real harm for the warnings to remedy, the warning provision was unnecessary. 239 Second, the companies claimed that the warnings required by the TCA were unlawful because they were larger and more prominent than the disclosures invalidated in Blagojevich 240 and Ibanez. 241 Finally, the companies contended that, because the disclosure requirement did not fall within the Zauderer exception, the graphics requirement should be assessed using strict scrutiny and struck down. 242 The district court dismissed each of these arguments. 243 First, citing studies that illustrated both the ineffectiveness of the purely textual warnings and the improved efficacy expected to come from the TCA labels, the court found the labeling requirement to be justified. 244 Second, the court found that the government had provided reasons for the particular size and format of the TCA warnings, distinguishing them from the warnings struck down in Blagojevich, in which the State failed to explain why a smaller warning would be inappropriate. 245 Finally, the court rejected the companies' argument to review the restriction under strict scrutiny. 246 The court reasoned that because the textual element of the TCA warnings was objective and uncontroversial, the additional graphic element was too. 247 impression that tobacco products are approved by, or safer by virtue of being regulated by, the FDA; (3) prohibitions on color and imagery in tobacco product advertising; (4) bans of event sponsorship, branding nontobacco merchandise, and free sampling. See id. at 519-20.
234. See id. at 521. 235. Since the suit in the district court was filed two months after the passage of the TCA, the FDA had not yet selected the images for the labels. After rejecting these arguments, the court subjected the provision to intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson. 248 In doing so, the court found that the warnings were sufficiently tailored to advance the government's substantial interest. 249 As a result, on January 5, 2010, the district court granted summary judgment to the government on the labeling requirement claim. 250 2. The Sixth Circuit Affirms, but Does So Using Rational Basis Review Under Zauderer
On March 19, 2012, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. 251 The court examined the law using a two-step framework: if the disclosure fit within Zauderer, rational basis review applied; if it did not, strict scrutiny applied under the Supreme Court's compelled speech doctrine. 252 The Sixth Circuit did not consider applying the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny standard.
Debunking arguments that images could never be factual or accurate, the court determined that the provision ought to be assessed under Zauderer. 253 The court cited three reasons for this. First, the court referenced images found in textbooks, from which students learn factual information about the body and disease. 254 Despite the possibility that people could have medical conditions that deviate from the depictions found in a textbook, those images remain factual; they do not become nonfactual or opinions. 255 Second, the court of appeals relied on Zauderer itself, reasoning that, because the Supreme Court had deemed the illustration of the medical device in that case to be constitutionally permissible, 256 pictures that accurately represent the negative health consequences of smoking were acceptable, too. 257 Finally, the court distinguished the TCA's labeling requirement from the disclosure struck down in Blagojevich. The TCA's required warning was 248 2012) . Like the district court, the Sixth Circuit considered a facial challenge to the TCA's labeling provision. See id. at 552-54. By the time this case reached the circuit court, the FDA had selected the nine images to appear on the warning label and had published its final rule regarding the new warnings. See id. at 552-53. Citing judicial restraint, the language of the district court's decision, the tobacco companies' admission that the challenge was a facial one, and Supreme Court precedent, the Sixth Circuit declined to review the labeling provision as-applied-that is, to review the specific images themselves for constitutional defects. designed to provide factual information, while the Blagojevich disclosure communicated the opinion of the government. 258 For these reasons, the court concluded that the TCA's labeling provision should be assessed using Zauderer rational basis review and was not subject to strict scrutiny. 259 After determining that Zauderer governed, the court examined the labeling requirement to determine whether the government had established a rational relationship between the provision and the goal of preventing consumer deception. 260 The court determined that the government had successfully carried its burden, citing the tobacco industry's "decades-long deception" of the public about the health risks and the addictiveness of smoking; 261 evidence that the existing warning requirements ineffectively conveyed the risks of tobacco use, particularly to youths and adults with low levels of education; 262 and evidence that larger warnings that incorporate images led to a greater understanding of smoking's health consequences. 263 For these reasons, the court of appeals found that the requirement passed muster under rational basis and was constitutionally permissible. 264 The tobacco companies petitioned for a rehearing en banc, which was denied on May 31, 2012, 265 and filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on October 26, 2012. 266
The Dissent: The Requirement Fails Rational Basis Review Under Zauderer
The dissenting judge in Discount Tobacco City, Judge Eric L. Clay, agreed with the panel majority that the provision should be scrutinized under Zauderer. 267 However, after doing so, Judge Clay concluded that the government had not shown that the warning labels were a reasonably tailored response to addressing tobacco consumers' ignorance of smoking's harms. 268 Specifically, Judge Clay was troubled that the graphic warning labels appeared calculated to provoke emotion and frighten consumers, rather than educating them or correcting misinformation. 269 Judge Clay identified a difference between providing truthful and sometimes frightening information to the public and "flagrantly manipulat[ing]" the emotions of consumers, and found it dispositive. 270 For Judge Clay, the latter was "less clearly permissible" than the former. 271 This was because the images provoked differing emotions among those who view them: some viewers inevitably interpret them in one fashion, while other viewers saw them another way. 272 Because of this incongruence, Judge Clay concluded that the labels "cannot accurately convey all of the health risks associated with tobacco use" and were thus not reasonably tailored. 274 to the TCA's labeling requirement and examined the nine images themselves for violations of the First Amendment. After concluding that the labels were not subject to review under Zauderer (i.e., they constituted mandated speech that was noncorrective), the court examined the labels using Central Hudson's intermediate scrutiny standard and found that the warnings offended the First Amendment. 275 In doing so, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the D.C. District Court, which held that the images were unconstitutional because they failed strict scrutiny. 276 One judge dissented from the majority opinion, arguing that the labels, with the exception of the 1-800-QUIT-NOW hotline number, were both constitutional under Zauderer and Central Hudson. 277 provision, and the FDA's implementation of it, violated their First Amendment rights. 279 Judge Richard J. Leon concluded that, because the provision forced speech, it was subject to strict scrutiny under the Supreme Court's compelled speech doctrine unless an exception-specifically, rational basis review under Zauderer-applied. 280 Judge Leon found that an exception was not warranted because the images were not designed to correct the same kind of misleading speech at issue in Zauderer and its progeny. 281 Accordingly, the court applied strict scrutiny. 282 Judge Leon determined that the TCA labels failed all three parts of the strict scrutiny analysis. 283 Regarding the first element, Judge Leon found that although the government's interest in warning consumers about the dangers of smoking was compelling, its interest in advocating that the public not purchase cigarettes, a legal product, was not. 284 As for the second, Judge Leon concluded that the "'sheer size and display requirements for the graphic images are anything but narrowly tailored.'" 285 Finally, Judge Leon accepted the five alternatives for reducing smoking rates that the tobacco companies offered as viable, less burdensome, and less restrictive than the warning labels. 286 For these reasons, Judge Leon determined that the FDA failed to meet its burden in proving that the graphic warning labels were narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. 287 286. See id. at 276. These five alternatives are: (1) the government could disseminate its antismoking message itself; (2) the government could reduce the label display requirements from 50 percent of the package to 20 percent; (3) the government could choose purely factual and uncontroversial images; (4) the government could increase cigarette taxes; and (5) the government could improve its efforts to prevent the unlawful sale of cigarettes to minors. See id.
The District Court Holds
287. including compelled speech-were subject to strict scrutiny with some exceptions. 291 Unlike the district court, the D.C. Circuit enumerated two exceptions in the commercial speech context: Zauderer and Central Hudson. 292 The court then examined the images to see if they fell into one of these exempt categories. 293 The court concluded that Zauderer was inapplicable. 294 It reasoned that because the TCA banned the practices and descriptors that would make cigarette advertising and labeling misleading, 295 and because of the absence of congressional findings on the misleading nature of cigarette packaging itself, scrutinizing the labels under Zauderer was unjustified. 296 The court then dismissed the argument that the failure to display the negative health consequences of smoking in label disclosures was misleading 297 and also rejected the argument that the warning labels should be evaluated in the context of the historical deception that preceded them. 298 Finally, the court held that the graphic warnings did not constitute the type of "'purely factual and uncontroversial' information" 299 or "accurate statement [s] ," to which the Zauderer standard applied. 300 Rather, the court characterized the images as "inflammatory" 301 and as "unabashed attempts to evoke emotion (and perhaps embarrassment) and browbeat consumers into quitting." 302 It also determined that the images were subject to misinterpretation by consumers. 303 Because the case did not fall under Zauderer, the court then determined whether strict or intermediate scrutiny was appropriate. 304 bans any labeling or advertising representing that any tobacco product 'presents a lower risk of tobacco-related disease or is less harmful than one or more other commercially marketed tobacco products,' 'contains a reduced level of a substance or presents a reduced exposure to a substance,' or 'does not contain or is free of a substance.' The Act also bans advertising or labeling using the descriptors 'light,' 'mild,' 'low,' or similar descriptors." (citation omitted)).
296. Circuit in Blagojevich-the court held that Central Hudson was the appropriate standard. 306 The court then scrutinized the labels using Central Hudson. 307 Applying Central Hudson's first prong, the court examined the administrative record and found that the government's primary goal in adopting the graphic warning rule was to "discourage nonsmokers from initiating cigarette use and to encourage current smokers to consider quitting." 308 The court assumed that this interest was substantial and moved on. 309 As for the second prong, the court evaluated whether the FDA had shown "substantial evidence" that the graphic warnings would "directly" reduce smoking rates. 310 The court concluded that there was "no evidence showing that [similar] warnings have directly caused a material decrease in smoking rates in any of the countries that now require them." 311 The court also took issue with the Canadian and Australian studies that the FDA had relied on in promulgating the final rule, noting that while these studies "indicated that large graphic warnings might induce individual smokers to reduce consumption, or to help persons who have already quit smoking remain abstinent," the studies "did not purport to show that the implementation of large graphic warnings has actually led to a reduction in smoking rates." 312 For these reasons, the court concluded that the FDA had not provided "a shred of evidence-much less the 'substantial evidence' . . . -showing that the graphic warnings will 'directly advance' its interest in reducing the number of Americans who smoke." 313 The court thus held that because the graphic warnings did not satisfy Central Hudson's second prong that the restriction be sufficiently related to a legitimate government interest, 314 they were an unconstitutional restriction on the tobacco companies' First Amendment rights. 315 The government petitioned for a rehearing en banc, which was denied on December 5, 2012, 316 In her dissenting opinion, Judge Judith W. Rogers found that the labels were constitutional under both Zauderer and Central Hudson, except with regard to inclusion of the smoking cessation phone number, which she found unconstitutional. 318 To Judge Rogers, because the labels were "indisputably commercial speech," the question was whether Zauderer or Central Hudson applied. 319 Judge Rogers argued that the labels presented factually accurate information and addressed misleading commercial speech, so Zauderer applied. 320 Accordingly, she then subjected the labeling requirement to rational basis review under Zauderer and found that it survived this basic level of scrutiny. 321 Additionally, Judge Rogers found the warnings constitutional under Central Hudson. 322 In reaching this conclusion, she took issue with the majority's articulation and examination of the government's stated interests in promulgating the labeling rule. 323 Judge Rogers argued that the FDA had articulated two complementary but distinct interests-decreasing smoking rates and effectively communicating the negative health consequences of smoking 324 -and that the majority erred in dismissing the latter interest as "too vague." 325 By doing so, Judge Rogers argued, the majority sidestepped much of the substantial evidence supporting the warning label requirement 326 and thus disregarded the "voluminous findings" that illuminated a legitimate government interest to which the labeling requirement was reasonably related. 327 For this reason, Judge Rogers determined that the government also met its burden under the heightened scrutiny test of Central Hudson. 328 Finally, Judge Rogers found that requiring the tobacco companies to include the 1-800-QUIT-NOW smoking cessation number on the graphic labels was unconstitutional, reasoning that the government had not explained why a less burdensome alternative was inadequate. 329 She concluded that the requirement was more extensive than necessary, thus violating Central Hudson's fourth prong. 330 III. THE TCA'S GRAPHIC WARNING LABELS SHOULD BE FOUND UNCONSTITUTIONAL As discussed in Part II, the Sixth and D.C. Circuits disagree over the constitutionality of the TCA's graphic warning labels, the appropriate level of scrutiny for analyzing these labels, and the appropriate framework for selecting that scrutiny. This part argues that the Sixth Circuit and the District Court for the District of Columbia pinpointed the correct framework for analyzing the graphic warning labels but that only the D.C. District Court applied it correctly. The D.C. District Court determined that the graphic labels did not fall within the Zauderer exception and thus analyzed them under strict scrutiny. The court then found that the labels did not satisfy strict scrutiny and determined that they were unconstitutional.
Accordingly, this part first asserts that the graphic warnings at issue in this split should be examined under strict scrutiny unless the Zauderer exception applies. Central Hudson is inapposite because it has been applied chiefly when commercial speech is restricted. This part then argues that the graphic labels do not qualify for the Zauderer exception and therefore must be strictly scrutinized. Finally, it concludes that the TCA warning labels do not survive this level of review and are thus unconstitutional.
A. A Framework for Analysis: The Labels Should Be Subjected to Strict Scrutiny Unless the Zauderer Exception Applies
The legal controversy over the TCA's graphic warning labels exposes the current messy state of First Amendment jurisprudence in the area of commercial speech. 331 such, should Zauderer not govern, the labels should be examined according to strict scrutiny.
Zauderer Applies If the Warnings Are Corrective
Amid the confusion over the proper analytical framework for assessing the graphic warnings, the place of the Zauderer exception is unambiguous. 334 Indeed, each of the decisions that form this circuit splitthe Sixth and D.C. Circuit majorities, the dissenting opinions, and the district court judgments alike-include the Zauderer exception as a part of their analytical frameworks. 335 This is most certainly because the Supreme Court is clear about Zauderer's applicability: if a compelled commercial disclosure (1) consists of "purely factual and uncontroversial information," (2) aims to protect consumers from "confusion or deception," and (3) is not "unjustified or unduly burdensome," 336 the disclosure falls within Zauderer's ambit. 337 Subsequent disclosure cases like Ibanez, 338 Milavetz, 339 and Blagojevich 340 confirm this.
Thus, because the requirement at issue in this split compels a disclosure of commercial speech, the Zauderer exception is a necessary component in the conversation regarding the First Amendment constitutionality of the labels. For this reason, if the labels fall within the confines of the Zauderer exception, they should be analyzed under it. 347 The Supreme Court should clarify this ambiguity to avoid further disagreement and confusion.
If Zauderer
This being said, the Court has implied that Central Hudson is inapplicable when examining laws that compel commercial speech like the TCA's warning label requirement. First, in subsequent application of the Central Hudson standard, the Court has only used it to determine the constitutionality of laws that restrict speech, not compel it. 348 This suggests that the Court does not intend for Central Hudson to be the default standard for assessing any and all laws that touch upon commercial speech. Instead, it appears that Central Hudson should be used only to scrutinize regulations that restrict commercial speech.
Second, in its required disclosure jurisprudence, the Court has emphasized the significant differences between laws that restrict speech and laws that compel it when deciding what standard of scrutiny to employ. The Court cited this difference in Zauderer itself as one reason for establishing a standard independent of Central Hudson. 349 And in Milavetz, the Court used the Zauderer standard because the challenged provision in that case imposed a disclosure requirement; it expressly noted that Central Hudson was inapplicable precisely because Central Hudson involved an affirmative limitation on commercial speech. 350 Although this second point is rooted in the Court's rationale for applying Zauderer in disclosure cases, it also highlights that a challenged provision's effect on commercial speech-that is, whether a law prohibits or forces commercial speech-is of crucial importance and must be taken into account. Furthermore, it suggests that Central Hudson's scope is limited to laws that dampen commercial speech, not to laws that compel it. For these reasons, Central Hudson should not be used if Zauderer does not apply. 351 Accordingly, strict scrutiny must be used to assess the warning labels' First Amendment fitness.
Strict scrutiny should apply not only because of deductive logic, but also because the Court's compelled speech doctrine requires it. This doctrine, exemplified by Barnette, Wooley, and Pacific Gas & Electric Co views that are repugnant to them unless the government can satisfy strict scrutiny review. 352 Given that the TCA labeling provision compels speech in the commercial context, the compelled speech doctrine should be used to analyze its constitutionality. Furthermore, the issue addressed in Pacific Gas & Electric Co.-the constitutionality of a government regulation that compelled a private company to voice the message of a third party with which it disagreed-is identical to the controversy sparked by TCA's labeling provision. 353 Therefore, just as the Sixth Circuit and the D.C. District held, courts should apply the compelled speech doctrine unless the Zauderer exception requires rational basis review.
B. Applying the Framework: The Labels Do Not Fall Within Zauderer's Ambit, Strict Scrutiny Applies, and the Labels Fail Under It
The previous section determined the appropriate framework for examining the labels' constitutionality. This section first applies this structure to the labels and determines that Zauderer does not apply. It then analyzes the labels under strict scrutiny and concludes that they do not pass muster under this heightened form of review.
Zauderer Does Not Apply
The first step in the analysis is to determine whether the labels should be assessed under the Zauderer standard. This Note concludes that Zauderer is inapplicable for three reasons.
First, Zauderer applies only under narrow circumstances. For Zauderer to govern, the compelled commercial disclosure must consist of "purely factual and uncontroversial information" aimed to protect consumers from "confusion or deception" that is not "unjustified or unduly burdensome." 354 Thus, the disclosure requirement in question must be "reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers." 355 Rather than preventing deception, the government's stated interest in promulgating the new graphic labels is to warn consumers about the dangers of smoking and to decrease smoking rates. 356 Moreover, the government's inclusion of the 1-800-QUIT-NOW number indicates that the purpose of the labels is not to prevent deception but is instead to advocate an antismoking message. Thus, while commendable as a public health strategy, the warning labels' goals differ significantly from the interest required to trigger the Zauderer standard. Second, even if the government's interest in promulgating the graphic labels were to prevent consumer deception, the graphic labels are not "reasonably related" to this interest. In Zauderer and Milavetz, the Supreme Court upheld provisions that required disclaimers that, if absent, would lead to almost certain deception and confusion in the marketplace. 357 The graphic warnings labels are distinguishable from those disclaimers because there is nothing inherently misleading about a cigarette package without an additional graphic warning label. Cigarette packages already possess textual warnings that convey factual information about smoking's dangers, 358 and the absence of a graphical element does not alter this. The disclaimers at issue in Zauderer, Ibanez, Milavetz, and Blagojevich all aimed to correct present and immediate deception, not past corporate deception. Thus, although the argument that the graphic labels correct the tobacco industry's history of deception is a compelling one, it does not fit within the narrow confines of Zauderer's applicability. Also, evidence that indicates that consumers do not read the current cigarette warnings does not mean that cigarette packages are therefore deceptive or misleading, merely that the current labels are ineffective. 359 Third, the images chosen by the FDA do not necessarily convey "purely factual and uncontroversial information" as required for a disclosure to be governed by Zauderer. 360 Rather, the FDA selected the nine images specifically to shock and provoke emotions like depression, discouragement, and fear. 361 Of course, the boundary between fact and emotion is not a clear one. The presentation of facts often spurs emotion, and vice versa. To fall within Zauderer's ambit, a disclosure must impart "purely factual and uncontroversial information." 362 The FDA's chosen images, 363 in contrast, have the potential to be controversial and misleading. Consider, for example, the photograph of a crying woman, which is coupled with the phrase "Warning: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers." 364 It has been proven that tobacco smoke leads to lung disease in nonsmokers, 365 and the textual warning that accompanies the graphic image imparts this fact to the reader. The connection between the photo of the distraught woman and the consequences of second-hand smoke are not at all clear, especially when viewed without the accompanying textual component. This is problematic, as one of the major reasons for introducing the new graphic labels is to address the documented inadequacy 357 361. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (describing the survey employed by the FDA to select the graphic images, which in part measured "salience," which the FDA defined in part as causing viewers to feel "depressed," "discouraged," or "afraid").
362. of the current labeling regime, which requires college-level readings skills to be understood. 366 Many of the other images are similarly controversial and misleading. 367 Taken together, the images cannot be said to impart "purely factual and uncontroversial information." For these reasons, the warning labels do not fall within the Zauderer exception and therefore strict scrutiny should apply.
The Labels Do Not Survive Strict Scrutiny and Are Thus Unconstitutional
Because Zauderer does not apply in this situation, strict scrutiny must be used to analyze the labels. To survive strict scrutiny, the government must (1) show a compelling interest, (2) narrowly tailor the regulation to promote that interest, and (3) demonstrate that no less restrictive alternative is available. 368 The D.C. District Court's application of this standard is reasonable and should be adopted.
As discussed previously, the D.C. District Court determined that the TCA labels fail each of the three elements of strict scrutiny. 369 First, although the government's stated interest in educating consumers about the dangers of smoking may be compelling, its actual interest in advocating that the public not purchase cigarettes is not. 370 Cigarettes are legal products, and the TCA itself forbids the FDA from banning their sale or mandating the elimination of nicotine from them. 371 Second, the labels are not narrowly tailored because their size and display requirements turn cigarette packages into a "mini-billboard" for the government's antismoking agenda. 372 The graphic warnings are thus similar to the four square inch sticker struck down in Blagojevich, which "literally fail[ed] to be narrowly tailored" because the sticker covered a substantial portion of the box. 373 Finally, five less burdensome and less restrictive alternatives are available to the government. 374 These alternatives include the government disseminating its antismoking message itself by increasing its antismoking advertisements and issuing additional statements in the press urging consumers to quit smoking. 375 These options alone burden and restrict First Amendment rights less than forcing the tobacco companies to advocate against their economic interests through the graphic labeling regime. 
